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PART ONE: 
 
SO: This is Dr Sue Onslow talking to Dr Martin Aliker at the Berkeley Hotel, 
London, on Wednesday, 22nd May 2013. Dr Aliker, thank you very much 
indeed for agreeing to take part in this interview project. 
 
MA: You’re most welcome. 
 
SO: I wonder if we could begin, please, at the point of independence, [when] 
you had been working for the Ugandan government. What was your 
view of the Commonwealth and of Britain at that particular time? 
 
MA: In 1962, the Commonwealth had not yet developed to the level it has 
developed now, because most of the African countries were still not yet 
independent. So, our sense of belonging to the Commonwealth was not really 
that strong. Our tie was mostly to the United Kingdom – because of obvious 
reasons, the most important being education. Many of us came to this country 
for university education. 
 
SO: Your first president, Milton Obote, was identified as being a very strong 
supporter of the Commonwealth. At the time of the transformation of the 
Commonwealth in the mid-1960s – with the expansion of newly 
independent African states and the creation of the Secretariat – it’s very 
evident, looking at the files, that President Obote took a particularly 
impassioned and engaged stand on Commonwealth issues. 
 
MA: Well, Obote could have appeared to be interested in the Commonwealth, but, 
basically, he was not that for Britain, as a politician. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
MA: Because he was brought up as anti-British. His politics started in Kenya, and 
it tended to be pro-east, Russian-orientated, communist; although, in Uganda 
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itself, the Ugandans were not pro-Russia. So, in order for Obote to rule the 
country, he had to show interest in the Commonwealth. 
 
SO: This was, then, a question of Obote using international issues to 
strengthen his domestic standing? 
 
MA: That’s right. That is correct. 
 
SO: As you recall, how much of a challenge was Rhodesia’s illegal 
declaration of independence in 1965 to the cohesion of the 
Commonwealth? Is this something that was discussed in Ugandan 
politics and Ugandan newspapers at this particular time? 
 
MA: The Rhodesian issue was very much discussed in Uganda. But Ugandans 
could not really identify themselves with Rhodesia because, distance-wise, 
Rhodesia is quite geographically far removed from Uganda. You have 
Tanganyika in between, you have Zambia in between. So, Ugandans didn’t 
really know much about Rhodesia. They were sympathetic, but they could not 
demonstrate their feelings about Rhodesia in any meaningful way. 
 
SO: So, how politically active were you at this particular point in the mid- to 
late-1960s? 
 
MA: Well… [Laughter] I was never really involved in politics. I have to make a 
confession. I was one of those people who did not see the need for 
independence in Uganda, because life was very comfortable under the 
British. We didn’t really see what more we wanted. We had everything: there 
was never any segregation in Uganda, the salary scales were the same, the 
facilities were all available. So, the agitation for independence was only 
amongst a few people. At that time, we talked about how those who were 
failures in life were the ones who went into politics. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: I’m sorry! [Laughter] How interesting! 
 
MA: Well, I can tell you the names of the people who went into politics. Milton 
Obote: Obote did not get a degree. He had no degree, but he left Makerere 
because they were not offering law. He wanted to study law and there was no 
law faculty, so he left. He left of his own accord. So, he didn’t have a degree. I 
can go through the names: George Magezi, Cuthbert Obwangor, Matthias 
Ngobi, Gaspari Oda, Alex Latim – all these fellows had no degree. There 
wasn’t, I don’t think, in the first government…Oh yes, in the first cabinet there 
were four people with degrees. There was William Kalema, Grace Ibingira, 
Joe Zake and Dr Emmanuel Lumu. Those are the ones I can think of who had 
degrees. 
 
SO: What you’re suggesting to me here, then, is that politics was seen very 
much as a second-class profession? 
 
MA: Very much so. Definitely, it was for those who were failures in life: people who 
had no definite careers or good prospects for the future. 
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SO: So, rather than it being intellectual leadership at independence and the 
energy and dynamism of first-class political minds, you’re suggesting in 
Uganda that this was not the case? 
 
MA: At the beginning it was not; even up to now it is not. Today, it is a means of a 
livelihood.  
 
SO: Ah, so, they seek to resolve ‘the problems of the bus queue’ through 
political office? 
 
MA: No, they seek to become members of parliament so they can get paid. 
 
SO: That’s what I mean: that, if you have problems in the bus queue, you 
become an official or member of parliament, so you can automatically 
jump ahead and get a Mercedes-Benz! 
 
MA: That’s right. Yes, this is how we view them. 
 
SO: So, in the 1960s, there was a remarkable disconnect between the 
intellectual elite, such as yourself – the professional elite – and the 
political elite, which was not engaged with grassroots activism? 
 
MA: There was no connection at all. I don’t remember anybody, say, from 
Makerere University joining politics. 
 
SO: That is an extraordinary debasement of your country’s intellectual 
capability and the resource pool in politics. 
 
MA: No…We did not view politicians very positively. 
 
SO: As you said on Monday, there was remarkable disdain for the idea of the 
country being ruled by commoners and people of ‘common intellect’. 
 
MA: Well, for the landed gentry – especially in Buganda – and the so-called 
‘Whose son are you?’ These are people who had property, people who had 
money, people who had status, and they could not see themselves being 
ruled by the sons of ‘Who is he?’ – commoners, so to speak. In Buganda, the 
problem persists to this day. They say that…The Baganda still expect a 
special position for themselves, which means a special position for the elite in 
Buganda, not for every Muganda. And, when they talk about what Buganda 
wants in the special status, they are really talking about going back to the 
time when the Kabaka was the absolute ruler and he dished out jobs as he 
saw fit. Well, that’s not going to happen anymore. 
 
SO: No, that system of patronage is not. So, by the latter part of the 1960s, 
had you become more politically active if you were criticising these 
second-class politicians? 
 
MA: Well…I didn’t, because I got more involved in business. So, that even put me 
further away from politics, and one of the reasons Amin took over government 
was that we never expected it to happen. We just could not see a coup in 
Uganda. A coup for what? Everybody was content. And Amin took over the 
government and we were all so helpless. We were not prepared for it. We 
couldn’t counter Amin in any way. Today it would be different: I don’t think 
Amin would have survived as long as he did – 8 years – in today’s Uganda. 
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SO: For the outside world there was the conundrum that Milton Obote was at 
a Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore when the 
coup happened… 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: You yourself left Uganda in 1972 to go to Kenya. 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Do you recall that there was much of a desire among the business elite 
– the exiled business elite of Uganda – and the exiled politicians, a 
desire for the Commonwealth to take a more prominent stance on what 
was going on inside Uganda in the 1970s? 
 
MA: Yes, there was. In fact, we felt very much let down by the outside world – 
especially the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom, which did nothing to 
try to get rid of Amin. Afterwards, the UK became interested – when Amin’s 
excesses became public knowledge – but, at the early stages, Amin showed 
a pro-British attitude and the High Commission at that time in Kampala 
thought the man was a good person. He fooled the High Commission. 
 
SO: But were you involved in any particular moves to try to encourage 
external international criticism, or criticism from within the 
Commonwealth? 
 
MA: From about ‘76, I not only encouraged but I actively participated in raising 
funds to topple Amin. 
 
SO: Did you have contacts with the Secretariat or the Commonwealth 
Secretary General to try to encourage declaratory statements that 
said… 
 
MA: No, no contact at all with the Secretariat. 
 
SO: I know that from talking to Sir Sonny Ramphal that he felt passionately 
that the Commonwealth was being extremely vocal in opposition to the 
white minority government of southern Rhodesia and, of course, 
apartheid South Africa, but it was not looking into its own internal 
abuses of human rights. 
 
MA: No. We, in Uganda, felt very much let down by the Commonwealth and 
particularly the UK, because the UK could have taken a lead which would 
have encouraged the other Commonwealth countries to be more critical of Idi 
Amin. 
 
SO: You said that you were involved in extending financial support for 
Amin’s removal. Had you also made any representations to the British 
government of James Callaghan? 
 
MA: No, I never did that. 
 
SO: Were you aware of others who might have done? 
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MA: I don’t know who actually made the representations, because Ugandans were 
spread out all over the world and some people who were living in the United 
Kingdom could have had access to some government officials. But I 
personally don’t know of anybody, and I personally never made any 
representation to the British government. 
 
SO: Dr Aliker, how important was the exiled Ugandan community in Nairobi 
at this point as a focal point of agitation for Amin’s overthrow? 
 
MA: Kenya was a conduit through which people passed. Some of us stayed in 
Kenya; many of us just passed through Kenya to go elsewhere. But the group 
that remained in Kenya was very, very active, because of [the] proximity with 
Uganda, and people would come and go and they would take messages and 
sometimes armaments.  
 
SO: Did you have discreet lines of contact with the Kenyan government? Or 
with Kenyan security forces, or people in State House? 
 
MA: With the Kenya government, yes. I personally had direct contact with the 
President. President Kenyatta was very sympathetic to Ugandans, and the 
Head of the Civil Service – Geoffrey Kariithi – was an ex-Makerere. In fact, 
almost all the Permanent Secretaries were ex-Makerere, and they were very, 
very sympathetic to us. When Kenyatta died and President Moi took power, 
he replaced most of Kenyatta’s appointees with his own appointees. Now, 
these are people who did not go to Makerere, and they had no sympathy for 
Ugandans. In fact, some of them thought we were savages because they had 
never been to Uganda.  
 
SO: They had no idea of the standard of Makerere University? 
 
MA: They had no idea that in education [and] socially, Uganda was far superior to 
Kenya. Our problems in Kenya as refugees started with President Moi’s rule. 
 
SO: So, your lines of access were good while President Kenyatta was alive, 
because of your contacts with him and his sympathies. In your 
description of the removal of Amin, the Commonwealth doesn’t appear 
to come out very well. 
 
MA: No. The Commonwealth didn’t do anything. 
 
SO: Well, the Commonwealth likes to present itself, of course, as sending 
the Commonwealth Observer Mission in December of 1980 to observe 
the elections between the four political parties – after Amin had been 
overthrown and then after General Lule had come in. 
 
MA: I came in with Lule. 
 
SO:   Were you involved in any of the discussions about bringing in the 
Commonwealth Observer Mission? 
 
MA: Well, let’s go back to Moshi [and] the [1979] Conference. At the Moshi 
Conference, General Tito Okello was the head of the Ugandan fighters – 
alongside the Tanzanians – against Amin. He came to Moshi and called me 
and said to me, “When we reach home, we – the fighters – want you to be the 
President of Uganda.” And I knew that if it was announced on the radio in 
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Uganda that I was going to be the President, by the time I got there my 
parents would be dead. And, at that time, the lives of my parents were far 
more important than my ambition of becoming President of Uganda. So, I 
persuaded Tito Okello to allow Lule to become the President, and it took me 
two days trying to convince Lule to become the President because he was not 
sure whether my tribesmen – the Acholi, who were fighting – would accept 
him. So, I am the one who made Lule the President. Otherwise, if I had been 
ambitious enough, I would have taken over. 
 
SO: Sir, in your role as ‘king-maker’ – because that’s what you were for Lule 
– or ‘president-maker’, I should say, did you maintain your authority and 
influence afterwards? 
 
MA: When we got back to Kampala, Lule asked me, “What do you want to be?” 
And I said, “I just want to help you.” And so I stayed with him in State House, 
in Entebbe, as his advisor. 
 
SO: Were you involved in inviting the Commonwealth Observer Mission to 
come in for that election? 
 
MA: No, Lule was already toppled. 
 
SO: He was; I’m sorry. It was quite a tumultuous time in Uganda! 
 
MA: [Laughter] Yeah, Lule was already toppled; Binaisa had also been toppled. 
So, it was the military commission, which included this present President – he 
was the deputy to Paulo Muwanga. Muwanga was the Chairman of the 
military commission; in fact, the President of Uganda at the time.  
 
SO: So, in your short time as Lule’s advisor, was foreign policy in any way 
one of your preoccupations? I appreciate that, given the tumult in the 
country and the need to re-establish the state and its legitimacy, this 
might not have been your top priority. 
 
MA: Foreign policy was the least of our problems. In fact, when Lule was toppled, I 
was in London. He had sent me here to come and meet with government 
officials to seek assistance. Another colleague, called Semei Nayanzi, who 
was also his advisor…We were both in London. He had come for a different 
reason. I was sent specifically by Lule to come and see government officials 
in the United Kingdom, because he knew that I have contacts. 
 
SO: Do you recall, sir, whom you came to see? 
 
MA: Edward du Cann. Yes, he was then the Chairman of the 1922 Committee. 
 
SO: My father was his successor. 
 
MA: Ah! 
 
SO: Why did you contact him? 
 
MA: Sir Edward du Cann was the Chairman of Lonrho, and I was Chairman of 
Lonrho in Uganda. So, I knew him. 
 
SO: So did Tiny Rowland have any particular role in assisting the… 
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MA: Not at that time. Tiny Rowland came in much later to assist the current 
President. 
 
SO: Okay. I was just thinking of what Tiny Rowland was doing to promote 
Joshua Nkomo’s cause via Lusaka and the whole Zambian connection. 
So, this was a role Tiny Rowland played in 1985-1987 to support 
Museveni? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Did you come to see du Cann in his capacity as chairman of the 
Conservative backbench committee – i.e. for his political connections – 
or in his capacity as Chairman of Lonrho? 
 
MA: For both reasons – because, as chairman of the 1922 Committee, he had 
influence in the Conservative government. 
  
SO: Yes. Did you make any time or effort to go to Marlborough House to talk 
to the Commonwealth Secretariat? 
 
MA: No, I came specifically to see du Cann. 
 
SO: And how much help was he? 
 
MA: Well, he was helpful, but not immediately. It was afterwards, when he put me 
in touch with Prime Minister Thatcher, that his assistance became obvious. 
Because, there came a time when we had nothing – no money in the 
Treasury, nothing at all… 
 
SO: It had all been looted? 
 
MA: Yes. And so Binaisa, as President, said, “Look, you know the people in 
England. Please go and ask for help.” [This was] the second time. And I, 
again, went to du Cann and he said to me, “Look, this is my secretary. You 
tell her everything” – which I did. She typed it all and gave it to me to read and 
I signed it. And du Cann then said, “Fine. I will try to get this to government.” 
The following day he rang me up and said, “I have two business people from 
Portugal coming to dinner at my house. Could you please come?” And he had 
a flat in Westminster. I had met his wife, Sally, and so I bought some flowers 
and took a taxi. When I got there, there was the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, Mrs Thatcher – whom I had met in Lusaka – and du Cann said to 
me, “Oh, I’m sure the two of you have something to talk about. Why don’t you 
come into my study?” Mrs Thatcher was having a sherry and I was given a 
sherry and she had my letter – the paper I had dictated to du Cann’s 
secretary. And she said, “This I can do, this I can do, this I have to ask my 
colleagues, this will take time, this I can do.” And, in five minutes, she had 
taken a decision. And then she said to me, “I’m sorry I can’t join you for 
dinner; I have another commitment.” And she got up and left with one person 
following her and outside there was not a single marked car. 
 
SO: That’s impressive. That’s very impressive. 
 
MA: So, that was my experience with Mrs Thatcher. 
 
8 
 
SO: What you’re explaining here, then, is the effect of extraordinary personal 
networks as well as good fortune. Business networks, political 
networks, dinner diplomacy, a quiet word with the Prime Minister…all 
combining to achieve important diplomatic results. 
 
MA: That’s right. 
 
SO: So, in a way, that is the Commonwealth at its best: a filigree of 
networks. 
 
MA: That is true. I have to make a personal confession: that, in this country, if I 
really must see somebody – and if I have a song to sing – then I can see 
somebody who knows somebody who knows somebody who will get me to 
see that person. But, I have to have a reason for seeing that person. 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
MA: So, in terms of connections…Yes, I have connections in this country. 
 
SO: Sir, is it the ‘old Commonwealth’ network? Not the ‘old boy network’, 
but the ‘old Commonwealth’ network. 
 
MA: [Laughter] Well, it’s a combination of both. For example, in any other country, 
one of the people could not have become a friend – because he was a District 
Officer, he would have been a ruler. But, in Uganda, and in my district, he was 
sort of a supervisor. And I met him when he came to my father’s court to have 
a look at the cases that had been decided – to make sure that justice was 
done – and we became friends. And through him, in his job, I got to meet a lot 
of people. So, whether it is Commonwealth, or the ‘old boy’ network, it is 
difficult. But let’s give the credit to the Commonwealth! 
 
 [Laughter] 
 
SO: Okay, if we must! It’s interesting that you had a meeting with Mrs 
Thatcher and not her Foreign Secretary. 
 
MA: No. I had met Lord Carrington in Lusaka… 
 
SO: Yes, you’d met him in Lusaka, as you’d gone down for the CHOGM 
meeting? 
 
MA: Yes. Now, it was very interesting. For the purpose of seating at the plenary 
session, [the name used] was ‘Britain’. For the purpose of accommodation, it 
was ‘United Kingdom’, which is right next to Uganda. And Mrs Thatcher – of 
her own free will – twice walked across the lawn by herself and came to see 
us in our house – we were with Binaisa – to talk to us. She was very 
sympathetic to us. 
 
SO: When you say she was ‘sympathetic’, you mean she was then prepared 
to listen to your need for state capacity building, for security sector 
reform?  
 
MA: Yes. She had just been elected. She was still very enthusiastic. 
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SO: So, you felt that she was a committed Commonwealth person, or a 
person committed to the reconstruction of Uganda? 
 
MA: She was, I think, both. And, of course, she had Lord Carrington as the 
Foreign Secretary. And he has remained a friend of mine to this day and he 
was, again, very sympathetic. 
 
SO:  So, going down to the Lusaka CHOGM, your deliberate intention was to 
solicit Commonwealth support for the reconstruction of Uganda? 
 
MA: Yes. I was taken by Binaisa for that purpose: to meet as many people as 
possible. 
 
SO: And how receptive was the Commonwealth to that? 
 
MA: Well, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, for example, was very sympathetic, but he 
was also trying to build up Singapore and he was in the middle. He did not 
have the resources to give us. But he was very sympathetic; I remember him 
being very pro-Uganda. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering because, in the literature, the Lusaka conference is 
taken as one of the triumphs on the path towards the ultimate Rhodesia 
settlement. But do you think that, in fact, meant that Uganda’s issues 
and needs were eclipsed because the political focus was elsewhere? 
 
MA: Yes. We were right next door to Rhodesia and the Rhodesian issue was very, 
very strong at that particular meeting. Mrs Thatcher tackled the Rhodesian 
issue head on. She did not support Ian Smith. This act totally disarmed those 
Heads of State who had come to Lusaka to oppose Britain, thinking Mrs 
Thatcher was going to support UDI under Smith. It was a dramatic triumph for 
Mrs Thatcher and saved the Commonwealth.  
 
SO: Besides Lee Kuan Yew, was the Secretary General giving Uganda any 
attention regarding its developmental needs, its needs for expert 
assistance…? 
 
MA: No, we were not given any particular recognition. We were given a chance to 
speak and Binaisa spoke as the leader of the Uganda delegation. But, 
nothing…No resolution was passed because Amin had already gone, so 
Uganda was no longer a burning issue – the reconstruction was no longer a 
burning issue – at that time. 
 
SO: Do you feel, then, that no political kudos could be gained by helping 
Uganda at that particular point? Or was it just that Southern Rhodesia 
seemed to be top of most people’s priorities? 
 
MA: Well, at that time, Southern Rhodesia was the burning issue. Uganda was on 
the back burner. 
 
SO: After Lusaka, the Commonwealth Observer Mission came to Uganda in 
December of 1980 to supervise elections. Were you involved in…? 
 
MA: I was very much involved. In fact, I stood on the Democratic Party ticket in 
Gulu South. The BBC sent a crew and they were told, “If you want to film a 
winner go to Gulu South.” And they came to one of my rallies. When the 
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children saw this van, they took off because they saw white people! By that 
time, there were children in Uganda who had never seen white people. They 
actually ran away from the BBC crew! 
 
SO: These ‘aliens’! 
 
[Laughter] 
 
MA: They had never seen white people. Amin had expelled most whites; the few 
remaining ones were in and around Kampala.  
 
That election was fair. Free and fair. And I want to stress this: there was no 
rigging. Absolutely no rigging. I went to one of my polling stations and the box 
was overflowing with votes for me. What happened was [that] after the 
elections and the result were sent to Kampala, Muwanga changed the names 
of the winner from the Democratic Party to the Ugandan People’s Congress. 
He just switched names: he never changed the votes. There was no rigging. 
People voted freely. 
 
SO: So, the election process – in terms of delivering a universal secret ballot 
– that process was free and fair. But it was the outcome that was 
manipulated?  
 
MA: Yes. I left Gulu because my results were declared in Gulu. I left Gulu to go to 
Kampala as a winner. I was about 50 miles from Kampala when I heard on 
the radio that my opponent had won. Now, I had polled 45,000 votes to his 
4,000 votes. 
 
SO: So, how much of this ‘electoral theft’ went on? I mean, in those 
elections, the Uganda People’s Congress got 73, the Democratic Party 
got 52. 
 
MA: First of all, in the West Nile, there was no voting because the UPC declared 
that it was a disturbed area. So, all the votes were given to the UPC. In Lango 
– Obote’s district – Democratic Party candidates were stopped from going to 
register. So, that gave the UPC about 22 votes already. When they 
announced Buganda votes it was 35 out of 35 in favour of DP, which wiped 
out the UPC lead completely and put the Democratic Party ahead. That’s 
when Muwanga said, “Nobody will announce the results except me.” And 
that’s when he changed the results.  
 
SO: That’s when he flipped it? 
 
MA: Yes. There are two very good examples – one in Kabale, involving the current 
minister, Ruhakana Rugunda. He lost to a fellow called Kitariko of the 
Democratic Party, and Rugunda actually signed that he lost. Two days later, 
he was told, “You have won.” 
 
SO: So, in which case, the Commonwealth Observer Mission… 
 
MA: They had left! The next day, after the results were announced by Muwanga, 
they left. Because Uganda was pretty raw at the time. 
 
SO: Yes, that’s very evident from looking at the files of the Secretariat. 
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MA: Yes. 
 
SO: And the violence in the Luwera triangle and the… 
 
MA: That had not yet started. It started soon after, but Uganda was raw with the 
Tanzanians in charge. 
 
SO: So, the process of the election was free and fair… 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: …but the outcome was stolen. 
 
MA: Yes. They just switched the names. The other [example] was in Tororo. A 
fellow called Okwenje was a UPC candidate who lost, and he signed that he 
lost. Two days later, he was told, “You have won.” He said, “How could I 
win?” “You must accept that you won,” he was told by the government. 
 
SO: So, if there was any hope that the Commonwealth – riding high after 
contributing to the Zimbabwe election monitoring process and 
endorsing it as free and fair – could replicate [this accomplishment] in 
Uganda, in fact, it was not a success? I mean, it was a success from 
observing the process of electoral voting… 
 
MA: Yes. They were there to make sure that people were free to vote, they were 
not there to confirm the results.  
 
SO: To validate the outcome? 
 
MA: No. And their report was correct [in saying] that it was free and fair. I was 
there, I was a participant, and I cannot say that my votes were stolen from the 
box. No, no. My votes were not stolen. They were counted properly in the 
District Commissioner’s office and I won by a wide majority. 
 
SO: Did you make representations to the Commonwealth? I mean, you must 
have tried to fight this. 
 
MA: No. It was not worth it, because Muwanga had already exhibited his extra-
judicial killings. I was a target because I had denied him the Presidency in 
Moshi. Because he was being fronted as a candidate that would eventually 
give the job to Obote – which he did, anyway, in the end. 
 
SO: So, how quickly did you go back into exile? 
 
MA: Almost immediately, because Muwanga was looking for me. I booked my 
ticket to fly out of Entebbe. The people in the airport knew what Muwanga 
wanted, because they had been instructed to report on my travels. So, I was 
booked three times by the people at the airport and they told me, “You come 
in the first booking.” And I flew out before Muwanga knew I had left. 
 
SO: Before the security forces were sufficiently organised? 
 
MA: Yes. And I didn’t come back while Muwanga was in power. In fact, I didn’t 
come back while Obote was in power, until he called for me in 1984. 
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SO: So, were you involved in exile politics between your… 
 
MA: During Obote’s time? 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
MA: No. I just assisted. Not directly. 
 
SO: How were you [assisting] ‘indirectly’? 
 
MA: In the sense that one of my friends, Chris Mboijana, was a key individual 
helping the Museveni group and I would help him financially when he was 
short of money. These people came, ate and slept in his house, and he had 
to buy food [and] buy drinks for them, and so I would contribute. 
 
SO: So, were you part of another network, back in Nairobi, supporting 
political opposition? 
 
MA: Not in the same way [that] I was during Amin’s time, no. 
 
SO: Okay. So, did the Commonwealth play any part, again, from what you 
are saying…? 
 
MA: I wouldn’t know, because I was not in Uganda. 
 
SO: I just wondered if you had maintained any connections back in London.  
du Cann, obviously, was no longer Chairman of the 1922 after 1984… 
 
MA: Well, I maintained contact with my private friends. [Laughter] 
 
SO: Okay. ‘Useful business contacts and private friends’. [Laughter] So, 
Museveni then achieved power through the National Resistance 
Movement in 1986. Were you involved in that final successful push 
towards Kampala? 
 
MA: No, because that was against my people – against Tito Okello. When Tito 
Okello took over power, two days later he rang me. I was in Nairobi and I flew 
to Kampala, and I was in Kampala for three days…and I left; I didn’t see him. 
Then he rang me again and I went…I was there for two days, and did not see 
him, and I didn’t go back. When he was toppled and he came to live in Nairobi 
in exile, I went to see him and he told me that he had wanted me to be the 
Minister of Finance but that Olara Otunnu did not want me anywhere near the 
government. 
 
SO: Why? 
 
MA: He was afraid of my being in government [because he thought] that I would 
overshadow him. 
 
SO: So, it wasn’t because you would necessary affect his [Okello’s] standing 
within the government, or affect Otunnu’s access to possible sources of 
patronage and disbursement? 
 
MA: Well, he just didn’t want my influence. 
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SO: Would you have accepted the position, had it been offered? 
 
MA: I don’t know. Because Obote, in his final days, sent for me. He wrote a letter – 
an official letter – asking me to go and see him. When I saw him, he said to 
me, “I have three jobs. I am the President, I am the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
and I am Minister of Finance. I can’t give you [the] Presidency because I want 
to be the President, but the other two you can have.” So, I didn’t know how to 
get out of it. I said, “But Mr President, I stood as a member of the Democratic 
Party, and if I now join your government, my supporters will think I have let 
them down.” And, I added, “Besides, there are people in your cabinet who 
would not want me anywhere near you.” I was thinking in particular of Sam 
Odaka and Luwuliza Kirunda, who absolutely hated me. And Obote’s reply 
was, “I can deal with them.” With his ministers. So, I said to him, “Mr 
President. I know you are going to have elections next year. When you have 
won your elections, I will not stand this time, and if you appoint me, I will be 
happy to come into your government.” 
 
SO: So, this was 1984-85? 
 
MA: Yes, and then he was toppled in ‘85 by Tito Okello, and then a year later 
Museveni took over. 
 
SO: So, is it fair to say, sir, that by this particular time Uganda had 
developed ‘politicised ethnicities’? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Which helps to explain Museveni’s emphasis on the ‘no party’ state – 
‘no party democracy’, as it were? 
 
MA: Yes. Museveni took advantage of the fact that the army was predominately 
northern-controlled. The Acholi and the Langi were in the majority. We had 
got rid of Amin’s people. Before the Amin coup, we – the Acholi – were 
dominant with the Langi and the West Nilers as part of the army. We were the 
leaders. 
 
SO: When you say that you managed to ‘de-politicise’ the Ugandan army 
and remove Amin’s people, did the Commonwealth help in any way? I 
know that Mrs Thatcher and Carrington were intent on providing 
support for security sector reform in Zimbabwe at this particular time. 
Did they also provide it to Uganda? 
 
MA: I don’t think so. I think there was assistance through the British High 
Commission during Obote’s time. During Obote’s time there was some 
assistance, but I don’t know how many people were involved and what their 
role was, exactly. [What] I mean about getting rid of Amin’s people [is this]: 
when Amin came to power, we, the Acholi, bore the immediate brunt of his 
killings. He got rid of most of the Acholi officers. When Amin was toppled, our 
people – alongside the Tanzanians – actually retaliated against the people in 
the West Nile. And it would have been worse if the Tanzanians were not 
there. The Tanzanians [provided some] restraint. 
 
SO: So, they acted as a peace-keeping force? 
 
MA: Yes, to a degree. 
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SO: Did you have contacts – in a political capacity – with Tanzania, with the 
Tanzanian leadership, with Nyerere’s people? 
 
MA: During Amin’s time? 
 
SO: Yes. 
 
MA: Yes. With Nyerere, directly. 
 
SO: Although, as you said, the 1979 developments sabotaged your own 
autonomous intention to remove… 
 
MA: Nyerere wanted to get rid of Obote from Tanzania. So, he was in favour of 
restoring Obote as President [of Uganda]. 
 
SO: So, in this complicated political story of contestation for power, when 
Museveni achieved power in 1986, how soon did he start sending out 
lines of contact to you, to invite you to come back to act as his special 
adviser? 
 
MA: Museveni sent for me in 1986. And I went to see him in State House in 
Entebbe, and he gave me two hours of his time and I left with two thoughts in 
my mind: that this man is either very sincere, or a superb actor. 
 
SO: And could you make up your mind which? 
 
MA: I said to myself, “I will give him the benefit of the doubt and I will help him.” 
And he exploited my contacts overseas. 
 
SO: In what way? 
 
MA: By sending me on missions which he could not send his ministers to. Which 
continues to this day. 
 
SO: Am I allowed to ask, what sort of missions? 
 
MA: [Laughter] Well…To meet people. 
 
SO: Sir, if I could just unpick this slightly…Where is foreign policy made in 
the presidency of Yoweri Museveni? Each political culture has its own 
focus of decision-making, of foreign policy activity. This can be both 
formal and informal. The President maintains control over foreign 
policy? 
 
MA: Yes, he does. 
 
SO: So, he would have a group of advisors? 
 
MA: I don’t know whether he has a group of advisors. I know what he and I do 
together. 
 
SO: This, then, implies a remarkable political friendship, and a reliance on 
key designated emissaries? 
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MA: I don’t know who the other emissaries are. I only know myself and I will give 
you one specific example. In 1995, Uganda and the Sudan had broken 
diplomatic relations, [and] so he brought me in as minister in ‘96. And my first 
job was to go to Sudan to mend fences. Between ’96 and 2002, I visited 
Khartoum eight times – talking with Bashir. My conversations with Bashir 
were not less than two hours – mostly three to four hours. So, Bashir and I 
know one another quite well. 
 
SO: Sir, I’d like to explore this further, but just to go back for one moment… 
For Museveni and yourself to establish an effective political alliance – 
because it seems to me that’s what it is – this may circumvent more 
formal channels within the Ugandan government, but is definitely to the 
benefit of Ugandan national interests. 
 
MA: Yes. Museveni never asked me to do anything really personal. It was 
personal in the sense that it involved him and individuals. 
 
SO: Is that his style of presidency? 
 
MA: I would imagine so. 
 
SO: In that he does not wish to see talent languishing on the opposition 
benches; the way the President recruits and involves all possible talent. 
 
MA: I was…to the last of his days, the go-between. I went to visit Gaddafi several 
times – on behalf of my government and some other foreign governments as 
well. 
 
SO: So, were you a spokesperson for the African Union? 
 
MA: No, I was only the personal emissary of Museveni. 
 
SO: And other foreign governments, too? 
 
MA: [Laughter] 
 
SO: Something tells me you may know Sir Mark Allen. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
MA: Well, we were in…[the Monitor Group]. I was involved in the Lockerbie issue. 
 
SO: Okay…Governments have formal bureaucratic lines of communication 
and all effective governments have informal lines of communications, 
because this is how governments work. In what way were you involved 
in the Lockerbie issue? 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE PART ONE] 
 
 
PART TWO: 
 
MA: As far as Lockerbie was concerned, Gaddafi was desperate to get his two 
arrested countrymen freed. So, he lobbied many governments, including the 
Israeli government. And he went to Museveni as Chairman of the OAU and 
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asked him if he could talk to the Americans. Museveni had no connection with 
the Americans, so he called me and he asked me to go and plead with the 
Americans to allow the case to be transferred to the UK. I remember telling 
him, I said, “Sir, I have succeeded in doing many things for you, but this one 
is going to be difficult because American public opinion is very much against 
the Libyans.” And he said, “Oh, well, you just go and add your little voice.” So, 
I called a friend in Washington who organised for me to meet with people 
from the CIA, and I was shocked – I made the request and they said, “We 
have no objection transferring the case to the UK, because British law is the 
same as ours.” And they said, “We will allow this case to be transferred to the 
UK.” And as I got up to leave, they said to me, “This time we are not going to 
shoot the messenger. We would have liked to shoot the sender.” 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: That was a vital piece of diplomacy, sir. 
 
MA: Anyway, when I went back and told Museveni, he said, “You see, I told you.” 
And two days later I was on the plane with him to Tripoli and there started my 
contact with Gaddafi. Because no sooner had the case been transferred to 
the UK than Gaddafi shifted the goal posts and wanted the case heard 
elsewhere. 
 
SO: So, sir, was it Museveni’s and your idea that it should be shifted to 
British jurisdiction? Where did that idea come from? 
 
MA: Gaddafi. Gaddafi asked Museveni to plead with the Americans to get the case 
transferred to the UK. Later, Museveni took me with him to the US to meet 
George Bush, and George Bush introduced Condoleezza Rice as the adviser, 
and Museveni introduced me to George Bush as his adviser. So, George 
Bush said, shaking my hand, “Ah, you and Condie will work together very 
well.” So, when the meeting ended, Ms Rice said to me, “We’d like to see you 
in Washington, when can you come?” I said, “Anytime.” She said, 
“Tomorrow?” I said, “Yes.” So, the next day, I went to the White House and 
we sat down with Condoleezza Rice and she started telling me, “The 
President told your President the following: Tell Gaddafi to denounce 
terrorism; tell Gaddafi to denounce weapons of mass destruction; tell Gaddafi 
to accept responsibility for Lockerbie, and to pay compensation.” And while 
we were talking, the President walks in: “How are you guys getting along?” 
And Condoleeza Rice said, “I’m telling Martin what we discussed.” So, 
George Bush said, “You go tell that cowboy to behave.” [Laughter]  
 
So, I left the White House, flew back to Uganda, and I reported to my 
President. Three days later, he said, “You are travelling to Tripoli.” We got to 
Tripoli and, after the formalities in the tent – the famous tent – Gaddafi told 
everybody else to leave except my President, myself and himself. And, 
suddenly, Gaddafi could speak English! 
 
SO: Remarkable! 
 
MA: My President said to Gaddafi, “My minister here has been to Washington and 
he has told me something that I want him to tell you himself.” So, I repeated 
what the Americans said: denounce terrorism; denounce weapons of mass 
destruction; accept responsibility for Lockerbie, and pay compensation. So, 
he said, “Number 1: terrorism. I denounce terrorism – because they wanted to 
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kill me, I killed them. 2: weapons of mass destruction. I don’t have any. I have 
intercontinental ballistic missile of 2000 km range, in case my neighbours 
cause trouble. Compensation – we will pay.” He left out responsibility. 
 
We went back to Uganda. I was sent back to Washington. I went and saw 
Condoleezza Rice and told her what Gaddafi had said. “What about 
responsibility?” I said, “He didn’t say anything.” She said, “You go back and 
ask him to accept responsibility.” I went back – this time by myself. Directly. 
Gaddafi did not accept responsibility. I went back to the White House twice. 
The third time, Condoleezza Rice said, “Martin, we love you very much, but 
unless Gaddafi accepts responsibility please don’t come back.” So, God 
came into play. The Court in The Hague found one man guilty, one man 
innocent. So, Gaddafi says, “He is a Libyan, we cannot abandon him.” That 
was his way of saying, “We accept responsibility.” 
 
All this time, I was shown the cheque for compensation: $10 million per 
person. The person in charge was Moussa Koussa, who jumped ship just 
before Gaddafi was killed. And he was my contact man. 
 
SO: Yes, and a very effective operator. 
 
MA: Well, I was shocked when he jumped ship, because when I went back for the 
last time – when NATO had already started bombing – he had already left. 
 
SO: Yes he had. He came here to London… 
 
MA: Yes, I know. He’s now back in Qatar. 
 
SO: Sir, you became a Special Advisor – formally – in 1990, shortly before 
the Harare Declaration of 1991, which emphasised the Commonwealth 
as moving towards a human rights and values-based organisation. To 
what extent was Museveni the recipient of advice from Chief Emeka on 
the need to introduce multi-party rule? 
 
MA: I think he took it seriously. I was not a party to it, so I don’t know the details.  
 
SO: So, you weren’t particularly aware of Chief Emeka’s contacts with 
Museveni or Museveni’s office to try and persuade him to move from ‘no 
party’ to multi-party rule?  
 
MA: Officially…No. I don’t know who, at that time, the Foreign Minister was – not 
Sam Kutesa. Rugunda was, at one time. [Paul] Ssemogerere was before 
Rugunda. Then there was [Eriya] Kategaya between. Incidentally, Museveni 
appointed me as a Minister of State for International Affairs, but my letter of 
appointment said, “You report directly to me.” So, I was like a teenage son, 
because Kategaya knew that he was not my boss. But because of his 
personality and because of his not being a friend of Museveni, he was willing 
to accept me. But I felt sometimes very awkward because Museveni would 
call me, would send me overseas, without Kategaya knowing anything about 
it. 
 
SO: So, you weren’t aware of this question of the Secretary General of the 
Commonwealth trying to use good offices to moderate and modify 
Ugandan politics? 
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MA: No. 
 
SO: When you became Foreign Minister in 1996, how much authority and 
autonomy did you have in international affairs for Uganda? Or was it 
still very much with the direction of State House? 
 
MA: No, he allowed me to take certain decisions. 
 
SO: Right. So, day-to-day decisions, or were you making strategic 
decisions? 
 
MA: Mostly strategic decisions. 
 
SO: Was that unusual? 
 
MA: I think so, because I remember Congo in ’98, when the opposition – the 
unofficial opposition [in Uganda] – wanted to…What do you do to a President 
if you want to get rid of him? 
 
SO: You impeach him. 
 
MA: Impeach! They wanted to impeach him. So, they told me and I rang up 
Museveni and I said, “I need to see you immediately.” He said, “How soon?” I 
said, “Now!” So, I went there and I told him, “Sir, you’re going to be 
impeached by Parliament for going into Congo without getting permission 
from Parliament. Unless you agree to address it.” And he said, “I will come.” 
So, that afternoon, we convened a meeting outside of parliament and he 
addressed it. And that’s how he diffused the impeachment process. 
 
SO: How politicised are the security forces? Are they very much within the 
President’s remit? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: I’m just wondering the extent to which they have autonomy for driving 
certain foreign policy [objectives]? 
 
MA: Like the army? No, that is totally under Museveni. 
 
SO: How about the Minister of Trade? Does he have any autonomy in 
negotiations in international diplomacy? 
 
MA: No, the whole government is now run by Museveni… 
 
SO: So it’s very hierarchical? 
 
MA: Yes, it is. No major decision is taken without Museveni – no major decision 
anywhere in government, which makes the Cabinet redundant. 
 
SO: It does, totally. 
 
MA: Yes. There are people in the Cabinet who have never seen Museveni alone. 
Never. Never seen him alone, they see him as a group. 
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SO: Excuse me, but that’s a dangerous concentration of power and 
responsibility. 
 
MA: Now, my relationship with Museveni is very peculiar. If I want to see 
Museveni, he will see me. Alone. Because he knows that I am a bearer of bad 
news. I never go to see him to tell him what a wonderful President he is. I only 
go to tell him, “Things are bad, this is what I know.” And while he may not say 
thank you, he appreciates that, and he understands that when I am knocking 
at the door I have a reason. 
 
SO: So, that implies that he hasn’t totally surrounded himself with yes-men 
and the sycophants. 
 
MA: Mostly. [It’s] mostly yes-men. 
 
SO: That’s dangerous. 
 
MA: It is. 
 
SO: Sir, thank you very much. 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE PART TWO] 
 
 
PART THREE: 
 
 This section of the interview takes place one day later, on 23 May 2013, also 
at the Berkeley Hotel, London. 
 
SO: Dr Aliker, I wonder, please, if we could continue talking about your view 
of the Commonwealth when you were Foreign Minister of your country. 
What was your view of the Commonwealth and Chief Emeka’s drive to 
support African democratisation in the 1990s? 
 
MA: Well, I met Chief Emeka a couple of times and spent quite a long time talking 
with him in Cyprus. He was very, very pro-Commonwealth and he tried to 
impress on me, as Minister from Uganda, the importance of the 
Commonwealth. But in Uganda itself, we were preoccupied with our own 
internal affairs, so we weren’t looking outside very much. Foreign affairs was 
important but only insofar as our neighbours were concerned. We were not 
looking much further than that, except for assistance by way of aid. 
 
SO: So, Ugandan foreign policy was driven by regional security concerns, 
principally, at that particular point? And also health issues? 
 
MA: We have never sat down to formulate a foreign policy, and I don’t think we 
have one. We have a policy of good neighbourliness, but that’s about all. 
[This] is forced on us by the issue of refugees. We always have refugees from 
Sudan, from Congo, from Kenya, from Rwanda. So, our foreign policy is 
dictated by our neighbours. 
 
SO: Would you say that’s also the case of your neighbours? That they, too, 
in your experience, don’t have foreign policies or strategies per se? 
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MA: I don’t think they do. It’s all [about] dealing with the issues that arise at the 
time. Generally, the only thing I know is that Uganda says she is friendly with 
all nations of the world and does not discriminate. In particular, Uganda 
stresses that it has no issues with China, because it has been argued 
sometimes that the Chinese win contracts because they are cheaper, and 
[that] they use prisoners and underage children to fulfil their contracts. But 
this is not really an issue with governments in Africa because there is no proof 
that these people are really prisoners, or whether it’s just propaganda. 
 
SO: You mentioned, sir, that your preoccupations in the ‘90s were 
principally internal in terms of the domestic health crisis, but there was 
also pressure for political reform, is that fair to say? 
 
MA: Political reform was happening already because there was the Constituent 
Assembly, which was rewriting the constitution of Uganda. And that was our 
preoccupation: to come up with a document that would stand the test of time. 
 
SO: Was Chief Emeka in any way trying to encourage President Museveni to 
accelerate political pluralism? 
 
MA: Well, if he did, it would have been at [a] level [that] I never knew about. 
 
SO: So, it would have been highly discreet, personal contact, which didn’t 
involve you? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Did you attend the Roundtable discussion down in Gaborone, convened 
by the Commonwealth with leaders and opposition leaders? 
 
MA: No, I didn’t go. 
 
SO: Did you send a delegate? 
 
MA: I think, yes, Uganda had a delegation there. But whatever they discussed 
there was never really publicised. 
 
SO: Did you then go to the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in 
Edinburgh in 1997? 
 
MA: No, I didn’t. I don’t know why, because I was very much there. Probably I was 
sent off on some mission; I don’t quite remember. 
 
SO: This was also the time Chief Emeka was trying to emphasise political 
and human rights within the Commonwealth. It seems to me that there 
was parallel momentum gathering to reform the OAU into the African 
Union through President Thabo Mbeki. For Uganda, did this take your 
energies away from anything to do with the Commonwealth, or in fact is 
that a misrepresentation? 
 
MA: I don’t think [that] it took Uganda’s energy away from the Commonwealth, 
because the OAU has always been there and every African nation thinks they 
have a contribution to make towards its reform. Although, there is a tendency 
for the Francophone countries to dominate it.  
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SO: So, you don’t think that there is a discrete Commonwealth bloc within 
the OAU? Obviously, the OAU is divided between the seven regions in 
terms of its security operations, its political and economic activities. But 
there’s no identifiable Commonwealth grouping? 
 
MA: No, no. One point I’d like to make is that the beauty of the Commonwealth is 
that its member states feel that they can approach each other, and if there is 
a dispute between two Commonwealth countries, the other people feel that 
they can come and tell them, “Look, you can’t go to war against one another 
because you belong to the Commonwealth.” I think this is the beauty of the 
Commonwealth. 
 
SO: So, you shouldn’t fall out ‘in the family’? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Did you come to have a particularly strong viewpoint regarding Rwanda 
joining the Commonwealth? After all, they come from a very different 
historical culture… 
 
MA: Uganda was very happy for Rwanda to join the Commonwealth because 
Rwanda and Uganda are basically the same country. They are different, but 
the same country, and Uganda has always provided the safety valve for 
Rwanda’s population. There are about two million Rwandese living in 
Uganda. 
  
At the time when the government of Rwanda and the government of Uganda 
were about to go to war against one another, the population didn’t see what 
was the problem. And I can also tell you that I was in the delegation that 
came to London. While President Kagame and President Museveni were with 
Prime Minister Blair at Number 10 Downing Street, the rest of us were left in 
the Commonwealth building near the Palace… 
 
SO: Marlborough House. 
 
MA: Marlborough House. The Rwandese were there, the Ugandans were there, 
and we were sitting around the same table and speaking in Luganda – not 
even in English! And I remember very vividly talking to the Chief of Security of 
Rwanda and I asked him, I said, “Where did you do your medicine?” He said 
“Makerere.” And I said, “Which school did you go to?” He said, “I went to 
Kings College, Budo.” Which is where I went! And he said, “I’m hoping that 
my son will get into Budo next year.” Now, here is a country with which we are 
about to go to war, and he wants his son to come and be in foreign and 
enemy territory? It didn’t make sense. There is basically no quarrel between 
Rwanda and Uganda. 
 
SO: At that particular meeting – in Downing Street, between Presidents 
Kagame and Museveni – this was the British Prime Minister using his 
good offices to… 
 
MA: Yes, to try to diffuse the tension. 
 
SO: Had the Commonwealth Secretary General tried to diffuse the tension? 
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MA: No, he had not. This was directly from the Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom. 
 
SO: So, in your experience, has the Secretary General in any way sought to 
assist Uganda in resolving disputes [or] in providing legal aid to your 
constitutional negotiations? 
 
MA: I do not know of any direct assistance from the Commonwealth. I know there 
are a lot of Ugandans employed in the Secretariat. At one time there was a 
Ugandan mafia talked about in the Secretariat.  
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: A strong group! So, the Commonwealth and its diplomatic machine – 
the Commonwealth Secretariat – in your experience hasn’t featured very 
prominently in dealing with the issues that Uganda has had to face? 
  
MA: I’ll tell you what. Our needs and requirements are of a monetary nature, and 
the Commonwealth Secretariat, as such, doesn’t have the funds. So, we tend 
to go directly to the individual Commonwealth countries for assistance, rather 
than go to the Secretariat. 
 
SO: Yes, but is there also a sense that Uganda is a strong enough country in 
its region, such that it doesn’t need to go through the Commonwealth? 
In other words, you already have an ‘in’. You have contacts that you can 
call, that you can exploit. 
 
MA: Well, from time to time I think we probably need the Commonwealth. I think 
the sense of belonging to the Commonwealth is more important than the 
assistance that one seeks from the Secretariat. A Ugandan student has no 
hesitation in applying to go to university in Australia, in South Africa, Canada, 
or India. He would hesitate if he had to apply to go to a university in Germany, 
for example. But, being a member of the Commonwealth, one feels that one 
really already has a foot in that country. 
 
SO: So, there is a sense of a cultural affinity? 
 
MA: That’s right. 
 
SO: This is not hard power, then; this is soft power? 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: In your view, how and why do you think the Commonwealth has 
survived? 
 
MA: One of the reasons for its survival is, one, the common bond of the language. 
And two: where we come from – [as] ex-British colonies. Most important is 
that Commonwealth nations do not interfere into the affairs of one another. 
 
SO: So, it’s a question of respecting sovereignty? 
 
MA: Yes, I think this is very important. 
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SO: But you said yourself, yesterday, that the trials and tribulations which 
Uganda endured from Amin’s coup in 1971 and all the way through to 
1986, that there was a need for external assistance and support: to 
support varying forms of democratisation in Uganda in the ‘70s and the 
‘80s. 
 
MA: Well, in the ‘80s. In the ‘70s, no, because you couldn’t…Amin was in control, 
and there was no talk about democracy. The democratisation process started 
after Amin was toppled. 
 
SO: I just wondered if there had been a sense – among your community of 
political exiles – of wishing for greater Commonwealth support at that 
point. And that would have interfered in Uganda’s internal affairs. 
 
MA: We expected the United Kingdom to take a stronger stance, and not other 
countries – not other Commonwealth countries. 
 
SO: In addition, then, to the bonds of language and the bonds of culture, of 
soft power, to what else do you attribute…How else do you explain the 
Commonwealth’s survival? 
 
MA: Ah. I think it’s just the accessibility [to] each other’s countries…[This] is an 
important reason why the Commonwealth has survived. 
 
SO: How much do you attribute to the persona and role of the Queen? 
 
MA: Oh, very, very important! When CHOGM took place in Kampala in 2007, the 
people were not interested in CHOGM: they were only interested in the 
Queen. And between Kampala and Entebbe, both the British High 
Commission and the Ugandan Police, estimated that there were 2 million 
people along the road, [standing] five deep. They were just interested in the 
Queen. They thought ‘CHOGM’ was the Queen’s husband. 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: ‘Move over, Prince Phillip!’ 
 
MA: No, really! The people…I had the honour to be invited by the Queen to lunch 
and I said to her, I said, “Your Majesty, I would like you to know that the 
people of Uganda are genuinely interested in seeing you.” And she said, “The 
Duke and I can feel it – the warmth of the people.” 
 
SO: To have come there and received such enormous popular acclaim… 
 
MA: Yes, yes. 
 
SO: How much importance did Uganda attach to holding the CHOGM in 
Kampala in 2007? I know that you’d had the referendum in 2005, [and] 
the Commonwealth had said that this was the process of democracy. 
Was this also part of a Commonwealth process of rewarding pluralism? 
 
MA: I think the majority of the people were very happy to have CHOGM held in 
Uganda. The opposition, I think, demonstrated an ‘anti-’ attitude, just for the 
sake of being different. What people resented afterward was the corruption 
that took place in the process of organising the meeting. There was, for 
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example, [the widening of] Entebbe/Kampala Road. It was not very 
satisfactorily done, because there was some kickback money. One person 
got a contract to wash 2,000 cars a day at the rate of 60,000 Uganda shillings 
per car. The Queen, for example, stayed in the Serena Hotel, which is just 
walking distance from the main hall. So, many people who stayed in that hotel 
never used their cars. So, this person got the money without doing the job. 
  
There was the beautification of Kampala: planting trees, planting grass. 
People exaggerated the cost and made a lot of money. That is the downside 
of it. But the actual meeting was a great success, and the Ugandans were 
extremely happy because, for once, they had the Queen, they had the Prince 
of Wales [and] they had the Prime Minister of Britain. So, it was a very strong 
delegation. 
 
SO: Yes, validation from people of authority. Also, of course, for the 
Commonwealth, at this time, one of the biggest challenges has been 
Zimbabwe. 
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: Since 2000. How far has that preoccupied you? 
 
MA: Well, in Uganda now we cannot talk about Zimbabwe because we are almost 
in the same soup. Our President has also overstayed, and so we can’t – as a 
government – criticise Zimbabwe. 
 
SO: Yet Uganda held its constitutional referendum in 2005, and then the 
Presidential election [was held] in 2006… 
 
MA: At that time, we were very critical of how Mugabe was treating his people. At 
the height of the inflation…I have, for example, a bank note for 100 million 
Zimbabwean dollars, which is of no value whatsoever. 
 
SO: I was told that the 500 million dollar bill was called ‘the red Ferrari’, 
because it stayed in people’s pockets such a short time! [Laughter] So, 
was President Museveni – and you, as his Special Advisor – in any way 
involved in the approaches to Robert Mugabe and the people in Zanu 
PF, to try to persuade them to step down? 
 
MA: No, we were not involved. 
 
SO: So, you’ve left that to SADC. 
 
MA: Yes, to South Africa. 
 
SO: Well, indeed, but South Africa in SADC.  
 
MA: Yes. 
 
SO: What about your neighbour, Kenya, which has gone through its own 
upheavals? Have you been involved in any way in trying to support 
democratisation following the violence of the elections of 2007, and the 
discussions between Raila Odinga and Kibaki? 
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MA: I know both of those people very well, but I know Kibaki better. From [my] 
Makerere days. And when I went into exile, I found myself his immediate 
neighbour in Hurlingham. I was there for one year and I bought a house in 
Muthaiga – a year later, Kibaki bought the house next to me. So, for 22 years 
we were neighbours and I used to play golf with Kibaki. Raila [and] I met 
afterwards, and the only social event we used to share was going to [the] 
sauna at the Hilton hotel on Saturday afternoons. 
 
 [Laughter] 
 
SO: So, you weren’t involved in any of the political brokering… 
 
MA: No, no. But because I know so many people in Kenya, I have had informal 
conversations with people in authority. 
 
SO: The Commonwealth seems to be a filigree of networks, of personal 
networks. You’ve just talked about the informal conversations between 
people of similar regional concerns. Can you see this surviving into the 
future? After all, it faces a number of challenges. 
 
MA: Well, I see the Commonwealth surviving. First, the English language binds us 
together, and second, the English law binds us together. So, in terms of 
governance, there are more factors that bind us together than the ones that 
separate us. What separates us is our own local condition, which applies only 
to a particular country. But anything that is of international significance, the 
Commonwealth brings us together. I think it is in the interest of most countries 
to stay in the Commonwealth [rather] than to go out of the Commonwealth. I 
don’t see the Commonwealth disappearing. 
 
SO: In your time in politics, has there ever been a movement in Uganda to 
pull out of the Commonwealth? 
 
MA: No. When Zimbabwe was being discussed, and when Obote went to 
Singapore, that was the time that they were talking about getting out of the 
Commonwealth. And, of course, you know the story about Kaunda and his 
burst of anger. He said to Edward Heath, “If you don’t give Zimbabwe or 
Rhodesia freedom, we’ll get out of the Commonwealth.” And Heath retorted, 
“If you get out of the Commonwealth we’ll take your pictures off our jam jars!” 
 
[Laughter] 
 
SO: Sir, thank you very much indeed. 
 
 [END OF AUDIOFILE PART THREE] 
 
 
 
